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Abstract
In this study we experimentally investigate whether solidarity, which is a crucial base for
informal insurance arrangements in developing countries, is sensitive to the extent to which in-
dividuals can influence their risk exposure. With slum dwellers of Nairobi our design measures
subjects’ willingness to share income with a worse-off partner both in a setting where partici-
pants could either deliberately choose or were randomly assigned to a safe or a risky project.
We find that when risk exposure is a choice, willingness to give is roughly 9 percentage points
lower compared to when it is exogenously assigned to subjects. The reduction of solidarity is
driven by a change in giving behaviour of persons with the risky project. Compared to their
counterparts in the random treatment, voluntary risk takers are seemingly less motivated to
share their high payoff with their partner, especially if this person failed after choosing the
risky project. This suggests that the willingness to show solidarity is influenced by both the
desire for own compensation and attributions of responsibility. Our findings have important
implications for policies that interact with existing informal insurance arrangements.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Given that formal insurance markets in developing countries are very limited, poor households typ-
ically rely on the help of family or friends in times of economic hardship. These informal exchanges
of gifts, loans or labour, which are motivated by social preferences or strategic incentives, serve de
facto as risk pooling devices and are an important, though not complete source for households to
cope with negative income shocks.1 A large body of literature investigated forms, motives and con-
straints of such informal risk sharing arrangements (see Fafchamps, 2011 for a review). However,
little attention has been paid to the relationship between mutual support and the extent to which
individuals can control their risk exposure. This issue refers to the fact that (positive or negative)
income shocks can either be the consequences of risky choices (e.g. investments) or completely ran-
dom events (e.g. accidents which affect work capacity), a distinction which might be quite relevant
for solidary behaviour for mainly two reasons. Firstly, evidence from the Western world suggests
that a considerable proportion of individuals favour redistribution when inequalities are caused by
exogenous circumstances rather than by factors of personal responsibility (e.g. Krawczyk, 2010;
Le Clainche and Wittwer, 2015; Roemer and Trannoy, 2015; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003).
Moreover, in line with the responsibility argument, experimental studies with students from high-
income countries find that subjects who exposed themselves to less risk ‘punished’ needy partners
that had taken higher risks by transferring or distributing less money (Bolle and Costard, 2013;
Cappelen et al., 2013; Cettolin and Tausch, 2015). Secondly, while the first point focuses on the
behaviour of the beneficiary of solidarity, there is also reason to believe that it matters for the will-
ingness to give whether the donor deliberately accepts risk for earning income or whether he can
earn the same income by pure luck. In the former case he may view part of the earned income as
compensation for bearing risk and choice costs resulting from foregoing safer opportunities which
may induce him to share less. This is in line with experimental evidence showing that subjects in
the US transfer less money to other persons if they earned income by effort rather than pure luck,
therefore rewarding themselves for their workload (Jakiela, 2015).
Direct evidence on the question whether the extent to which individuals can control their
risk exposure affects solidarity is scarce and mainly based on two experimental studies conducted
in high-income Western countries (Trhal and Radermacher, 2009; Cettolin and Tausch, 2015).
1Informal insurance arrangements are shown to fail to provide full insurance, even against idiosyncratic shocks
(Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Kinnan, 2014; Townsend, 1994). Explanations for incomplete informal insurance are
limited commitment, i.e. households with positive income shocks have incentives to leave the not legally enforceable
insurance arrangement, or limited information, i.e. information asymmetries offer the possibility of shirking (moral
hazard) or of pretending a negative shock in order to claim support or to escape payment obligations towards group
members (hidden income).
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These studies contrast the situation where subjects are exposed to exogenous income risk with
the situation where subjects can choose freely between a risky and a safe(r) income option. Both
studies find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that individuals are less generous towards those
whose bad outcome is a result of their own risk-taking action compared to just bad luck. However,
these findings are not necessarily transferable to developing countries. The countries in which the
studies have been conducted (Germany and the Netherlands) have comprehensive social security
systems that strongly limit the extent to which individuals need to rely on other people’s solidarity.
In contrast, in developing countries, where public social security nets are absent, mutual voluntary
help is an important source for households to cope with negative income shocks. This is supported,
for example, by Jakiela (2015), who finds that Kenyan villagers make virtually no difference in their
allocation decisions with respect to whether income was earned by exerting real effort or the result
of pure luck, while the contrary was the case for US students which seemingly rewarded themselves
and others for their effort. Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) compare students in Belgium, Burkina
Faso and Indonesia regarding answers to hypothetical questions about the fair distribution of ex
post tax income and subsidies for health expenditures in different scenarios. When participants
think that individuals in the case studies are responsible for their behaviour (e.g. in the case of
smoking and low effort) the majority favours not to compensate for the consequences or even to
punish the responsible person. This opinion is particularly strong in the Burkinese sample, which
points to relevant differences in fairness perceptions.
Our study is - to the best of our knowledge - the first to investigate in a developing country
whether individuals condition their giving behaviour on the extent to which they and their part-
ners can influence own risk exposure using an incentivized experimental approach. Experimental
evidence from middle- and low-income countries on the relationship between control of exposed-
ness to risk and solidarity is so far limited to a strand of literature that investigates whether the
introduction of voluntary formal insurance has a crowding-out effect on informal mutual support.
All three existing experiments which have been conducted in the Philippines (Landmann et al.,
2012), Cambodia (Lenel and Steiner, 2017) and China (Lin et al., 2014) find that the availability of
formal insurance reduces informal transfers. The experimental designs have in common that they
exogenously expose participants to a risky outcome in one treatment and allow them to reduce this
level of risk exposure by choosing an insurance option in a second treatment. However, in focusing
on insurance purchase decisions, these studies deal with a special case of risk avoidance. In partic-
ular, the validity of the measured impact on solidarity critically hinges on a proper understanding
of, and some familiarity with the concept of insurance which is, however, typically not given for
the majority of people in less developed countries (cf. Lenel and Steiner, 2017).
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As the first key contribution we, therefore, test whether poor individuals’ solidarity is sensitive
to the degree of control subjects have over their risk exposure in a context without public social
safety nets based on a laboratory experiment we conducted with slum dwellers in Nairobi. In a
between-subject design with two different randomized treatments similar to Cettolin and Tausch
(2015), each participant could either choose (treatment CHOICE) or was randomly assigned (treat-
ment RANDOM) to a safe or a risky project. The risky project involved a one-half probability
to end up with a zero payoff. After being randomly matched with another person, subjects could
make voluntary transfers to their partner. We find that when risk exposure is a choice, the share of
subjects picking the risky project is 30 percentage points lower and that overall willingness to give
is roughly 9 percentage points lower compared to when risk is exogenously assigned to subjects
which is in line with the evidence for developed countries. However, we also find some interesting
differences to these studies. For example, in contrast to Cettolin and Tausch (2015) we find that
lucky winners with the risky project show a particularly high degree of solidarity with unlucky
losers when both face risk for exogenous reasons. This suggests that the willingness to share un-
expectedly high income with individuals with unexpectedly low incomes is higher in developing
countries where mutual aid is voluntary and has a strong tradition compared to industrialized
countries where mutual aid is enforced by social insurance systems.
As the second key contribution we show that the average effect of CHOICE on giving is not
informative about the behavioural effects we are interested in if giving depends on the level of
risk faced by donors and CHOICE leads to largely different distributions of risk than RANDOM.
Behavioural effects occur if individuals show different willingness to give in CHOICE than in
RANDOM if they are exposed to the same level of risk. However, even if there are no such effects
differential risk taking under CHOICE can produce a mechanical effect on the average willingness
to give. To see this assume that risk takers exhibit higher willingness to give than non-risk takers
and that the treatment itself has no impact on the behaviour of both groups. Because the share
of risk takers in CHOICE is much smaller than in RANDOM the average willingness to give in
CHOICE will be lower than in RANDOM because the group with higher willingness to give receives
a smaller weight. As a result, we would measure a negative overall treatment effect although risk
takers and non-risk takers do not behave differently under CHOICE than under RANDOM, i.e.
although there is no behavioural effect. We propose to estimate the so-called average controlled
direct effect (Pearl, 2001; Robins, 2003) to test whether the average effect on the willingness to give
we measure is entirely caused by differential risk taking under CHOICE against the alternative
of the existence of a behavioural effect (Acharya et al., 2016). This effect can be obtained by
estimating the effect of CHOICE conditional on risk exposure. This, however, requires taking
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into account that donors who self-select into a specific project in CHOICE differ systematically
from donors who are randomly assigned to the same project in RANDOM. Hence, the observed
differences in transfers conditional on project provide biased estimates of the treatment effect. We
address the issue of selection bias by drawing on a rich data set collected within our experiment.2
When studying giving behaviour conditional on risk taking, we find that donors with the safe
project exhibit the same willingness to give independent of whether they have avoided risk de-
liberately or by pure chance which highlights another interesting difference to the findings from
high-income countries. In contrast, donors who have deliberately chosen the risky project are sig-
nificantly less willing to give than those exposed to the risky project for exogenous reason. This
result implies that we can reject the hypothesis that the average effect on the willingness to give
we measure is entirely caused by differential risk taking under CHOICE compared to RANDOM in
favour of the alternative of the existence of a direct behavioural effect. Our findings show, though,
that the behavioural response is limited to risk takers. This asymmetry compared to holders of the
safe project supports the hypothesis that willingness to show solidarity is influenced by the desire
for own compensation. Moreover, as donors who have chosen the risky project show particularly
low solidarity with beneficiaries that self-select into the risky project we also find support for the
hypothesis of attributions of responsibility. These findings have important implications for policies
that possibly interact with existing informal insurance arrangements, such as the promotion of
profitable but riskier innovative technologies or formal insurance to reduce risk exposure, which
may crowd out solidarity.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section describes in detail the
experiment we conducted including the data we collected within the experiment. Section 3 explains
our empirical strategy and discusses its empirical implementation, estimation, and plausibility.
In Section 4 we present and discuss results. The last section concludes. An appendix contains
supplementary information and estimation results.
2 The experiment
2.1 Experimental context
We conducted a laboratory experiment at the Busara Center of Behavioral Economics in Nairobi,
Kenya. The centre provides a state-of-the-art lab infrastructure, including 20 computer-supported
workplaces. It maintains a subject pool with currently around 5,000 registered individuals, mainly
2Cettolin and Tausch (2015) also report the observed differences between treatments conditional on project but
they do this to assess effect heterogeneity without acknowledging the problem of the mechanical effect. Moreover,
they do not take into account self-selection into projects.
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recruited from two different Nairobi informal settlements, the Kibera and Viwandani slum. The
living situation in these slum communities is characterized by extreme poverty and insecurity due
to the lack of property rights and high criminality. Housing and hygiene conditions are very poor
since the government does not provide water, electricity, sanitation systems or other infrastructure
(The Economist, 2012). Most of the slum residents work as small-scale entrepreneurs and casual
workers in the informal sector, therefore relying on uncertain and irregular income streams. Related
to the lack of formal employment, most of the slum dwellers have no formal risk protection such
as health insurance (Kimani et al., 2012). Many households are, however, member in some kind of
social network, such as merry-go-rounds, which allow saving and borrowing and implicitly provide
an informal safety net (Amendah et al., 2014).
In Kenya, in general, there is a strong spirit of harambee (the Swahili term for ’pulling together’)
which encloses ideas of mutual support, self-help and cooperative effort. Harambee takes various
forms, such as local fundraising activities to help persons in need or the joint implementation of
community projects (e.g. building schools or health centers). While being an indigenous tradition in
many Kenyan communities, the concept became a national movement since Kenya’s first president
Komo Kenyatta used it as slogan for mobilizing local participation in the country’s development
(Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Mathauer et al., 2008; Ngau, 1987). In the light of this strong tradition of
solidarity and seemingly well-established informal security nets it is therefore particular interesting
and important to understand which behavioural mechanisms drive willingness to support others.
2.2 Experimental design
2.2.1 Risk solidarity game
The core game of the study aims at measuring solidarity behaviour in situations where subjects
either can choose or are exogenously assigned to certain risk exposure. Figure 1 gives an overview
on the sequence of steps in the game. At the beginning, two projects were presented to each
subject: a safe option offering 400 KSh and a risky alternative yielding either 800 or 0 KSh with
equal probability. Depending on the treatment, subjects could either choose (treatment CHOICE)
or were randomly assigned (treatment RANDOM) to one option. After the choice or random draw,
each participant was randomly and anonymously matched with another person. Using the strategy
method3 (Selten, 1967), subjects were then asked how much money they wanted to transfer to
their partner in case of winning the ‘high’ (HEADS) payoff of their option (i.e. 400 or 800 KSh).
Hence, before revealing their partners’ choice (or assignment) and earnings, participants stated
3Brandts and Charness (2011) show that the strategy method is a valid alternative to the direct-response method,
with both leading to similar results.
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their gift for every possible payoff of their partner (i.e. 400, 800 or 0 KSh).4 At the end of the
session, lottery outcomes were randomly determined and transfers effected according to the actually
realizing states. The stakes of the game represented considerable amounts for the mainly very poor
participants who reported on average a daily income of 161 KSh (∼1.50 USD).
Figure 1: Sequence of steps in the risk solidarity game
The design implies that in the random treatment, subject’s income is determined purely by
chance, while in the other treatment, it can be influenced by the participant’s choice. In particular,
becoming a needy person, i.e. earning the zero income from the lottery, is just bad luck in RANDOM
but involves a voluntary decision for the risky lottery in CHOICE. The imposed trade-off between
a safe and a risky option thereby ensures that risk taking is salient to the participants. Moreover,
since the payoffs of the two alternatives both equals 400 KSh in expectation, the risky option reflects
a mean-preserving spread of the safe alternative implying that taking the risk is not compensated
by higher expected income. Hence, choosing the lottery is not utility maximizing for risk averse
individuals and possibly unnecessary in the risk-sharing partner’s view since avoiding the risk is
not costly. This case has also been studied in the related experimental literature (e.g. Bolle and
Costard, 2013; Cettolin and Tausch, 2015; Trhal and Radermacher, 2009) since it provides an
important benchmark for the effect of risk exposure choice on solidarity in alternative scenarios in
which risk taking is either beneficial or even unfavorable in terms of expected income.
The design as an anonymous one-shot game deviates from conditions of real-world solidarity
in developing countries which typically takes place among persons within the family or neigh-
bourhood in repeated exchanges. Keeping subjects’ identity confidential is, however, necessary
4As last step, the subjects were also asked to indicate how much they expected to receive from their partner,
whereby these statements were not incentivized. This information is, however, not used this study.
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in order to avoid that possible real-life relationships or fear of sanctions outside the lab bias be-
haviour of participants. Further, by restricting the game to one single round we implicitly rule
out that subjects base their risk-taking and sharing decisions on strategic considerations induced
by repeated interactions. This isolates the effect of risk taking on giving behaviour motivated by
(social) preferences, such as altruism or distributive preferences (cf. Charness and Genicot, 2009),
which represents an important reference case since it avoids that possibly interacting intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations blur the measured impact. Overall, since our design excludes issues of social
pressure and reciprocity considerations that probably would have reduced the participants’ incen-
tives to punish a risk-taking partner our experiment is likely to measure an upper bound of the
behavioural effect of free project choice on solidarity.
2.2.2 Procedures
For recruitment, subjects were randomly chosen from the Kibera and Viwandani subject pool
registered at Busara and then invited by SMS. A precondition for being selected was an education
level of at least primary school to ensure some familiarity with numerical values as necessary in
our study. The recruited persons were randomly assigned to treatments, therefore resulting in
a between-subject design. The entire experiment was run within 13 sessions in the period of
August to October 2014. Seven sessions were conducted of the RANDOM treatment and six of the
CHOICE treatment. In total, 228 subjects participated in our study, thereof 102 in the RANDOM
and 126 in the CHOICE. Of the 228 experimental subjects 51% are female, 40% are married and
42% live in the Kibera slum. On average, the participants are 31 years old and have a schooling
level of 12 years.
Upon arrival, subjects were identified by fingerprint and randomly assigned to a computer sta-
tion. The instructions were then read out in Swahili by a research assistant, while simultaneously,
some corresponding illustrations and screenshots were displayed on the computer screens (see Ap-
pendix B for an English version of the instructions, exemplarily for CHOICE).5 For the entire
experiment the z-Tree software code (Fischbacher, 2007) was programmed to enable an operation
per touchscreen which eases the use for subjects with limited literacy or computer experience. Sub-
sequently, some test questions verified the participants’ comprehension of the game rules. In case of
a wrong answer, the subject was blocked to proceed to the following question. A research assistant
then unlocked the program and gave some clarifying explanations if needed. This guaranteed that
all participants fully understood the games and did not simply answer the test questions by trial
5In general, all verbal explanations of the research assistant were made in Swahili whereas information on the
computer screens was written in English. This combination has proven to be useful for facilitating comprehension
(Haushofer et al., 2014).
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and error. After the comprehension test, the participants performed the actual experimental task.
The experiment involved, firstly, a risk preference game which aimed at measuring subjects risk
attitudes (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed description of this game) and, secondly, the risk solidarity
game explained in detail in the previous section. Importantly, the subjects completed the decisions
in these two games without learning the realized payoff in the precedent game. Moreover, after
randomly determining the game payoffs at the end of the experiment, only the result of one ran-
domly selected game was relevant for real payment.6 These two design features avoid that results
are biased due to any strategic behaviour, expectation forming or income effects across games.
At the end of the session, participants completed a questionnaire covering important individual
and household characteristics. After the session, subjects received 200 KSh in cash as show-up
fee.7 The earnings of the incentivized games, which amounted on average to 412 KSh per person,
were transferred cashless to the respondents’ MPesa accounts.8
2.3 The data collected within the experiment
2.3.1 Survey data
In the post-experimental survey we collected all individual and household-related data which are
important for the validity of our empirical strategy (see Section 3.3 for more details). Besides basic
demographics this includes information on health, occupation, income, asset ownership, financial
risk exposure as well as social preferences. Table 3 provides an overview of the retrieved variables.
2.3.2 A measure of risk preferences
Since subjects’ risk attitudes are an important determinant of risk-taking behaviour in the risk
solidarity game and therefore a key variable to deal with selectivity under CHOICE, we elicitated
an experimental measure of risk preferences which is comparable across both treatments. Prior
to the risk solidarity game we ran a risk preference game which was incentivized and designed as
an ordered lottery selection procedure (Harrison and Rutstroem, 2008). Originally developed by
Binswanger (1980) for an experiment with Indian farmers, the method is commonly used to elicit
risk attitudes in developing country settings since it is relatively simple to demonstrate and easy
to understand. Other standard elicitation procedures, such as the approach of Holt and Laury
6Laury (2006) shows that experimentally measured risk behaviour is not sensitive to whether subjects are paid
for all choices or only one randomly selected decision (at the same payoff level). The random-choice payment is
therefore a valid method that allows to increase the number of observations and to maximize the salience of payoffs
for a given budget.
7Participants coming from Viwandani received additionally 200 KSh as reimbursement of (higher) cost of trans-
port. Moreover, for all respondents, arriving on time was awarded with 50 KSh.
8MPesa is a mobile-phone based money transfer service. It allows to deposit, withdraw and transfer money in a
easy and safe manner with help of a cell phone. Its use is very widespread in Nairobi slums where around 90% of
the residents have access to this service (Haushofer et al., 2014).
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(2002) as well as non-incentivized survey questions (Dohmen et al., 2011), have turned out to be
less successful in creating reasonable results in low-income settings, seemingly being too complex or
abstract for the typically low-educated populations (Charness and Viceisza, 2011; Fischer, 2011).
In the game, each subject was asked to choose one out of eight different lotteries (see Table 1,
Table 1: Risk preference game: payoffs, expected values, risk and levels of risk aversion
Lottery
number
Lottery High payoff
HEADS
(p=0.5)
Low payoff
TAILS
(p=0.5)
Expected
value
Standard
deviation
Risk aversion
range (CRRA)a
Fraction of
subjects (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 K 320 320 320 0 2.46 to infinity 36.8
2 L 400 280 340 60 1.32 to 2.46 10.5
3 M 480 240 360 120 0.81 to 1.32 6.1
4 N 560 200 380 180 0.57 to 0.81 14.1
5 O 640 160 400 240 0.44 to 0.57 2.7
6 P 720 120 420 300 0.34 to 0.44 7.0
7 Q 800 80 440 360 0 to 0.34 14.5
8 R 880 0 440 440 -infinity to 0 8.3
Note: a As common in literature, we assume the individual’s utility function u(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ , where γ is the CRRA parameter
describing the degree of relative risk aversion. The intervals for the CRRA parameter were determined by computing γ
where the expected utility from one option equals the expected utility from the next option, i.e. where the individual is
indifferent between two neighbouring lotteries.
columns 2 to 4). The first alternative offers a certain amount of 320 Kenyan Shillings (KSh).
The subsequent lotteries yield either a high (HEADS) or a low (TAILS) payoff with probability
0.5. While the first six lotteries are increasing in expected values and variances of payoffs, the last
lottery R has the same expected payoff as Q, but implies a higher variance. Hence, only risk-neutral
or risk-loving subjects should choose this dominated gamble (Binswanger, 1980).
Typically, the lottery numbers that subjects choose in ordered lottery designs (here: 1 to 8)
are directly used as risk preference indicator (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 2002).9 In order to check
whether they represent a plausible measure in our setting we test with the help of a regression
analysis that is shown in Table A1 in the Appendix A how they are related to individual and
household characteristics.10 We include covariates reflecting subjects’ socio-demographic situations
as well as their ’real-life’ background risk exposure, since this might influence their risk-taking
behaviour with respect to the ’foreground risk’ introduced by the experiment (Harrison et al.,
2010). In particular, we use proxies for health risk exposure (past and expected future health
9The lottery numbers (LN) can be regarded as a parametric index of risk preference, since they are linearly
related to the lotteries’ expected payoffs (EP ) and standard deviations (SD) (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). In our
game the lottery number can be calculated as LN = EP/20 − 15 and the expected payoff as EP = 320 + 1
3
SD
(cf. Eckel and Grossman, 2002, p.7). In fact, this is only the case for the first seven options, as the last lottery is
the dominated gamble with EP equal to the seventh lottery. Strictly speaking, the lottery number is therefore an
ordinal rather than a metric variable. However, in summary statistics and regression analyses, we nevertheless use
this indicator as risk preference measure and treat it therefore as metric, since it is more intuitive to interpret than
alternative indicators for risk taking, such as the (continuous) standard deviation of lotteries. Moreover, it makes
virtually no difference for estimation results whether lottery numbers or SDs are used.
10In Strobl (2016) we also statistically test whether the scenarios of the precedent investment game influenced the
lottery choices in the risk preference game. However, we do not find evidence for such a bias.
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shocks, health insurance enrolment) and for the ability to informally cope with shocks (wealth,
household composition). Moreover, a proxy for perceived social capital in the society (GSS index)11
is included in view of the empirical observation that people invest higher proportions in risky assets
in areas with higher levels of social capital (Guiso et al., 2004). The study finds that the effect of
social capital is particularly strong where education levels are low and law enforcement is weak,
which is the typical situation in developing countries. Finally, we add two dummies that measure
inequality aversion since evidence suggests that inequality aversion is positively correlated with
risk aversion (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos, 2010).12
We find that being employed in a paid occupation is associated with higher risk aversion, an
observation similarly made by Falco (2014). He shows that more risk averse workers in Ghana are
more likely to search for formal employment than being engaged in the informal sector, seemingly
in order to avoid the volatile income streams from informal work. Most of the coefficients, namely
that from the variables reflecting health insurance enrolment, health care utilization, wealth and
social capital, have the expected signs but are not statistically significant, which is, however, not
an implausible finding given our small sample size. Overall, given the encouraging results of the
plausibility test, we will use the lottery numbers as an indicator for subjects’ risk preference in the
following empirical analyses.
Table 1, column 8 reports the distribution of lottery choices made in the game. According to
these results, we conclude that a majority of participants is risk averse since 77.2% of the subjects
selected one of the first six lotteries. 14.5% and 8.3% of the respondents chose the 7th and 8th
lottery, respectively, and exhibit therefore risk-neutral and respectively risk-seeking behaviour.
To compare the level of risk aversion from our sample with that from other low-income settings,
we determine the average degree of risk aversion. For this, we follow Dave et al. (2010) and adapt
the estimation procedure initially used for the Holt-Laury approach to our lottery choice task.
Assuming the CRRA utility function u(x) = x
1−r
1−r and using a maximum likelihood method, we
estimate the average risk parameter r for our sample.13 The estimated rˆ is 0.72 (p=0.000), implying
11As common in literature we included the following three General Social Survey (GSS) questions in our ques-
tionnaire which claim to measure social capital: 1. Fairness: “Do you think that most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (1=”Would try to be fair”; 0=”Would take
advantage”); 2. Trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?” (1=”Most people can be trusted”; 0=”You can never be too careful in dealing with
people”); 3. Helpfulness: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just
looking out for themselves?” (1=”Try to be helpful”; 0=”Just look out for themselves”). The GSS Index represents
the sum of answers to the three questions (i.e. it takes discrete values between 0 and 3).
12In order to measure inequality aversion we use the following questions: 1. Inequality 1 (disadvantageous): “How
much do you agree/disagree with the following statement? ”Other people should NOT own much MORE than I
do.”; 2. Inequality 2 (advantageous): “”Other people should NOT own much LESS than I do.” (1=Strongly disagree;
2= Disagree; 3=Undecided; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly Agree). We create two dummies for the two types of inequality
aversion which take each the value 1 when the subject answered with 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.
13The detailed procedures to estimate the risk parameter are described in Harrison (2008) and Harrison and
Rutstroem (2008). In brief, it is assumed that for each choice between two lotteries, the individual calculates the
10
that the mean participant is “very risk averse” according to the classification scheme of Holt and
Laury (2002). Therefore, our study subjects reveal on average a higher degree of risk aversion than
reported in other studies. For example, the estimated CRRA coefficient was 0.54 in a three-country
experiment in India, Ethiopia and Uganda (Harrison et al., 2010), 0.45 in Peru (Galarza, 2009)
and 0.39 in South Africa (Brick et al., 2012). This difference compared to other settings might
be explained by the relatively riskier environment (as described in Section 2.1) and therefore due
to the higher real life background risk that subjects face in the Nairobi slums. Moreover, social
capital, as mentioned above as an motivating factor for financial risk taking, seems to be lower
in Nairobi slums than in other regions. In a five-country (Armenia, Guatemala, Kenya/Kibera,
India, the Philippines) group lending experiment, Cassar and Wydick (2010) find dramatically
lower individual contributions rates to public goods in Kibera than in the other country samples,
a result which is driven by the lack of confidence in other members. Greig and Bohnet (2008) find
in their Nairobi slum experiment one of the lowest levels of trust ever reported from a Trust Game.
2.3.3 Outcome of interest
The most important source of data stems from the risk solidarity game which measured transfer
behaviour under the CHOICE and RANDOM treatment. Figure 2 displays the distributions of our
major outcome of interest, the stated amounts of transfers (in KSh), by treatment and sender’s
project. We only consider transfers from subjects with higher payoffs to partners with lower
payoffs, i.e. from safe project owners to partners with zero income (400→0) and from lucky risky
project holders to partners with safe or zero earnings (800→400 and 800→0).14 The reason for this
restriction is that we are interested in solidarity which is necessary for mutual aid arrangements
to work, implying redistribution of income from better-off to worse-off subjects (and not the other
way around). Figure 2 shows that the majority of subjects decided to give nothing to their partner.
The cases of zero transfers range roughly between 60% to 75% depending on the treatment and
which project the sender was assigned to. Moreover, the observed transfers are concentrated on
few marked values. Given this unbalanced distribution, which is difficult to model empirically
with the relatively small sample sizes in the experiment, we focus in the following on the outcome
variable willingness to make a transfer rather than on the absolute amount of money. Thus, we
index ∇EU = EUR−EUL, where the expected utility for lottery i with k different outcomes is EUi =
∑
k
(pk × Uk)
and the subscripts R and L refer to the ’right’ and the ’left’ lottery, denoting two neighbouring lotteries in the menu.
Transforming ∇EU into the ratio ∇EU = EU
1/µ
R
EU
1/µ
R
+EU
1/µ
L
yields a probabilistic choice function that expresses the
probability of choosing the right lottery. Moreover, the noise parameter µ allows us to account for any behavioural
errors (e.g. due to inattentiveness or a lack of understanding). The ratio builds the base of a conditional log-
likelihood function that can be maximised with regard to µ and the CRRA risk coefficient r.
14This implies excluding 33 observations where persons transferred money to partners with equal income (400→400
[n=18] or 800→800 [n=3]) or even with higher income (400→800 [n=12]).
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use as outcome of interest an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the participant makes
a positive transfer to his partner and 0 otherwise.
Figure 2: Distribution of transfers (in KSh) by treatment and sender’s project
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Causal effects of interest
3.1.1 Overall treatment effects
Firstly, we are interested in the question how the possibility of choosing freely between a risky
and a safe project (treatment CHOICE, C = 1) as opposed to random assignment of projects
(treatment RANDOM, C = 0) affects risk taking (R), on the one hand, and the willingness to make
transfers to worse-off individuals (outcome Y ), on the other hand. Using the potential outcome
framework typically applied in the statistical evaluation literature with a binary treatment variable
C, we denote by Y c potential willingness to make transfers given regime C = c where c ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, we denote by Rc potential risk exposure given regime c ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, we set R = 0
if the safe project has been chosen or randomly assigned, and R = 1 for the risky project. The
overall effect of free project choice on risk taking, which we denote as θR , is hence given by
θR ≡ E[R1 −R0] = Pr(R1 = r)− Pr(R0 = 1),
and the overall effect of free project choice on willingness to make transfers, denoted as θY , by
θY ≡ E[Y 1 − Y 0] = E[Y 1(R1)− Y 0(R0)],
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respectively. Both overall effects are identified because the treatment status C has been randomized
in the experiment, where randomization of C is equivalent to the assumption
(A1) : Y 1, Y 0, R1, R0⊥C.
While it is natural to be interested in the overall effect of CHOICE on the willingness to make
transfers we show in the following that this effect is not informative about the behavioural effect
we are interested in. The overall effect θY can be decomposed as follows:
θY = E[Y
1(R1)− Y 0(R0)] =
∑
r∈{0,1}
E[Y 1(r)]Pr(R1 = r)− E[Y 0(r)]Pr(R0 = r).
Now assume that there are no behavioural effects. Behavioural effects occur if individuals with
the same project under CHOICE as under RANDOM show different willingness to give in the two
treatments. For example, the willingness to support partners that have exposed themselves to the
risky project by their own choice may be lower than the willingness to support partners who end
up in a risky situation for exogenous reasons that lie outside their own power due to attributions
of responsibility. Also, individuals that have been lucky in a lottery may be more willing to give
than individuals who have exposed themselves to a certain risk (and return) for a good reason and
at some cost for which they want to be compensated. The absence of behavioural effects implies
that E[Y 1(r)] = E[Y 0(r)] for r ∈ {0, 1}. In this case we can write the overall effect as
θY = E[Y
0(1)− Y 0(0)][Pr(R1 = r)− Pr(R0 = 1)] = E[Y 0(1)− Y 0(0)]θR.
As a consequence, whenever E[Y 0(1)] 6= E[Y 0(0)], i.e. when subjects with the safe project under
RANDOM show different average willingness to give than subjects with the risky project under
RANDOM, and θR 6= 0, i.e. there is differential risk taking under CHOICE than under RANDOM,
then we will have a non-zero overall effect θY 6= 0 even if the behavioural effect E[Y 1(r)]−E[Y 0(r)]
is zero for every group. Therefore, we need to estimate the behavioural effects E[Y 1(r)]−E[Y 0(r)]
for r ∈ {0, 1} directly. These effects are called the average controlled direct effects in the literature
(Pearl, 2001; Robins, 2003). If we can reject the hypothesis that these are zero for at least one
r ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. for subjects with either the safe or the risky project or both, then we can reject the
hypothesis that the overall effect θY is entirely caused by differential risk taking under CHOICE,
i.e. by the treatment effect on risk exposure θR, and provide evidence for the existence and the size
of behavioural effects (Acharya et al., 2016).15
13
3.1.2 Treatment effects conditional on risk exposure
Identification of the behavioural or average controlled direct effects θY,r ≡ E[Y 1(r)]−E[Y 0(r)] for
r ∈ {0, 1} is more challenging because we need to take into account that subjects have self-selected
into the project R = r under CHOICE which implies that E[Y 1(r)] does not equal the expected
observed willingness to give of holders of project r under CHOICE, E[Y |R = r, C = 1]. In the
RANDOM treatment, risk exposure is randomly assigned, where randomization is equivalent to
the assumption
(A2) : Y 0⊥R|C = 0
which implies that E[Y 0(r)] equals the expected observed willingness to give of holders of project r
under RANDOM, E[Y |R = r, C = 0], for r ∈ {0, 1}. To identify E[Y 1(r)] we impose the assump-
tion that we observe all factors X that determine both the endogenous choice of the risky versus
the safe project and the willingness to make transfers, i.e. that the following unconfoundedness
assumption holds:
(A3) : Y 1⊥R|X = x,C = 1.
If this assumption is satisfied we have E[Y 1(r)] =
∫
E[Y |R = r,X = x,C = 1]dFX(x), i.e. we
can reweigh the observations with R = r,X = x under CHOICE according to the distribution of
characteristics X in the population FX(x) which is equal to the distribution in the randomized
samples FX|C=c(x) for c ∈ {0, 1}. Unconfoundedness cannot be tested and hence needs to be
plausibly justified. Whether this justification is convincing crucially depends on the richness of
available data which should contain information on all relevant confounding variables. Additionally,
we need to ensure that there is no combination of risk exposure R and covariates X that perfectly
predicts treatment status C, i.e. that there is common support in the covariate distributions of
RANDOM and CHOICE conditional on R:
(A4) : 0 < Pr(C = 1|R = r,X = x) < 1, r ∈ {0, 1}.
In other words, we need to make sure that for each individual with R = r,X = x in RANDOM
there is a comparable individual with R = r,X = x in CHOICE. The common support assumption
is testable in the data.
15In a companion paper (Wunsch and Strobl, 2017) that makes a methodological contribution to the literature on
the identification and estimation of causal mechanisms we propose and apply different methods to decompose the
overall effect into the mechanical effect and the behavioural effect. We find that the behavioural effect that does
not go via the change in risk-taking explains at least 75 percent of the total effect.
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3.2 Empirical implementation
We apply both parametric and semi-parametric methods to estimate the overall and conditional
treatment effects. For the parametric estimations we use probit models given that all outcomes
are binary. Additionally, we use semi-parametric inverse probability weighting (IPW) which has
the advantage of allowing for heterogeneity in treatment effects. This takes recent evidence into
account which suggests that parametric methods such as OLS or probit that implicitly assume
effect homogeneity might yield biased estimates if this assumption is in fact violated (Sloczynski,
2016). Table 2 summarizes the different estimations we run in terms of the effect of interest, the
dependent variable, the treatment variable and the sample we use for the estimation.
Table 2: Effect estimations
Effect of interest Dependent Treatment Sample
variable
Overall treatment effects
Effect θR Ri Ci all
Effect θY Yi Ci all
Treatment effects conditional on donor’s risk exposure
Effect θY,0 Yi Ci Ri = 0
Effect θY,1 Yi Ci Ri = 1
Parametric estimators of the overall effects are obtained by (probit) regressing the outcome
of interest (risk exposure R or willingness to make transfers Y ) on the treatment dummy C.
Covariates X are not necessary in these regressions if randomization worked but may be included
to increase precision. The choice of control variables for all estimations is discussed below in Section
3.4. For the effect of CHOICE conditional on risk exposure, θY,r, we regress willingness to make
transfers on CHOICE C and the set of covariates required for selection correction (see the detailed
discussion in Section 3.4) within the subsamples with R = 0 and R = 1, respectively. We also
check common support (A4) and run all estimations with and without enforcing common support.
The latter excludes 12.7% of all observations. Moreover, to assess possible heterogeneity in giving
behaviour with respect to the choices made by the recipients of transfers we reestimate everything
restricting the sample to transfers to partners with the risky and safe project, respectively.
The IPW coefficients for the overall and conditional treatment effects are estimated in a stan-
dard two-stage approach which, first, uses probit regressions to predict the treatment status and
to derive inverse probability weights and, second, contrasts the weighted mean outcomes of both
treatment groups to estimate the average treatment effects (ATE). The covariates and samples
used in the IPW approach are the same as in the parametric (probit) models.
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3.3 Plausibility of the empirical strategy
3.3.1 Did randomization work?
As a first step, we check whether randomization in the first and second stage of the experiment
was successful in creating comparable groups in terms of individual and household characteristics.
To assess assumption (A1) - randomization of CHOICE C - Table 3 displays in column a) mean
characteristics for the RANDOM and CHOICE sample, respectively, as well as their differences.
It shows that the two samples are balanced well in terms of most characteristics. Statistically
significant differences are observed, though, for age, income, some aspects household composition,
ethnicity, residence in the Kibera slum and one of the two measures of inequality aversion. A
closer look at these differences reveals, however, that most of them are driven by the difference in
residency shares in the Kibera slum because Kibera residents are younger on average and have on
average smaller households and lower household income. Moreover, we will show below that our
results are robust to including those covariates with imbalances.
To assess assumption (A2) - randomization of projects R in the RANDOM sample - Table
3 displays in column b) mean characteristics for individuals with the safe and risky project ran-
domly assigned, respectively, as well as their differences. The large majority of characteristics are
balanced well. The only exceptions with statistically significant differences occur for the charac-
teristics married, Nubian ethnicity, the fairness measure and the risk aversion measure. However,
by including these variables as control variables, we are again able to show below that our results
are not driven by these imbalances.
Table 3: Means of variables by treatment and project
(a) RANDOM and CHOICE (b) RANDOM (c) CHOICE
RANDOM CHOICE Diff.a safe risky Diffa safe risky Diffa
(1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1)
A. Individual characteristics
Socio-economic characteristics
Age 29.57 32.28 2.71** 30.8 28.49 -2.3 31.95 33.57 1.62
Male 0.52 0.49 -0.03 0.47 0.57 0.09 0.52 0.38 -0.14
Education (years compl.) 12.06 11.98 -0.08 11.97 12.13 0.17 11.98 12 0.02
Married 0.39 0.42 0.03 0.49 0.3 -0.19** 0.4 0.52 0.13
Household (HH) head 0.5 0.52 0.02 0.54 0.46 -0.08 0.52 0.52 0.01
Monthly income 3,811 6,038 2,227*** 4,239 3,434 -804 5,749 7,152 1,403
Kibera slum 0.48 0.34 -0.13** 0.49 0.46 -0.03 0.32 0.43 0.11
Occupational status:
Employed 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.15 0.19 0.04
Self-employed 0.25 0.31 0.07 0.27 0.22 -0.05 0.32 0.29 -0.04
Work without payment 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.06
Student 0.19 0.13 -0.06 0.2 0.18 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.02
Unemployed 0.33 0.29 -0.03 0.27 0.37 0.1 0.32 0.19 -0.13
Other 0.06 0.06 0 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.1 0.05
Main occupation:
Selling goods 0.19 0.23 0.04 0.24 0.15 -0.09 0.2 0.33 0.14
Manufacturing/repairing goods 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0 -0.05**
continued on the next page
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(a) RANDOM and CHOICE (b) RANDOM (c) CHOICE
RANDOM CHOICE Diff.a safe risky Diffa safe risky Diffa
(1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1)
Offering services 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.03
Domestic work 0.17 0.14 -0.04 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.07
Farming 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.1 0 -0.10***
Other 0.39 0.35 -0.04 0.39 0.39 0 0.37 0.29 -0.08
Religion (1=christian) 0.9 0.85 -0.04 0.86 0.93 0.06 0.85 0.86 0.01
Ethnicity:
Kamba 0.09 0.2 0.11** 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.05
Kikuyu 0.31 0.37 0.06 0.32 0.3 -0.02 0.36 0.43 0.07
Kisii 0.13 0.08 -0.06 0.15 0.12 -0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.04
Luhya 0.25 0.15 -0.10* 0.25 0.24 -0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.01
Luo 0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.1 -0.03
Nubian 0.05 0.05 0 0.08 0.01 -0.07* 0.05 0.05 0
Other 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0 -0.05**
Health-related characteristics
Health problemb 0.44 0.51 0.07 0.46 0.42 -0.04 0.53 0.43 -0.1
Chronical health problem 0.13 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.09 -0.1 0.11 0.29 0.17
Visited health care providerb 0.45 0.54 0.09 0.47 0.43 -0.04 0.54 0.52 -0.02
Health expendituresb 1,104 901 -203 1,283 946 -336 879 986 107
Enrolled in health insurance (HI) 0.23 0.23 0 0.29 0.18 -0.11 0.19 0.38 0.2
Enrolled in other insurance 0.1 0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.14 0.09
Social preferences
Inequality aversion 1 (disadv.)c 0.26 0.32 0.06 0.29 0.24 -0.05 0.3 0.43 0.13
Inequality aversion 2 (adv.)c 0.28 0.38 0.10* 0.25 0.3 0.04 0.33 0.57 0.24*
GSS questions:
Fairness 0.31 0.28 -0.03 0.39 0.24 -0.15* 0.28 0.29 0
Trust 0.19 0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.14 -0.04
Helpfulness 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.27 0.24 -0.03 0.27 0.24 -0.03
GSS Indexd 0.75 0.73 -0.03 0.81 0.7 -0.11 0.74 0.67 -0.07
B. Household characteristics
Socio-economic characteristics
No. of adults 2.7 3.69 0.99*** 2.68 2.72 0.04 3.75 3.43 -0.32
No. of children 1.9 2.17 0.27 2.02 1.79 -0.23 2.26 1.81 -0.45
Monthly per capita (p.c.) income 3,312 2,773 -539 3,744 2,933 -811 2,700 3,058 358
No. of other earners 1.02 1 -0.02 0.95 1.07 0.13 1.11 0.57 -0.54**
No. of dependent HH members 2.23 2.83 0.60* 2.47 2.01 -0.46 2.78 3.05 0.27
HH is in wealth index quintilee:
Poorest quintile 0.34 0.31 -0.03 0.36 0.33 -0.03 0.32 0.29 -0.04
Poorer quintile 0.1 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.1 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.03
Middle quintile 0.17 0.23 0.06 0.2 0.13 -0.07 0.22 0.24 0.02
Richer quintile 0.22 0.17 -0.06 0.17 0.27 0.1 0.17 0.14 -0.03
Richest quintile 0.17 0.23 0.05 0.19 0.16 -0.02 0.22 0.24 0.02
Health-related characteristics
Health expenditures (p.c.)b 550 612 62 639 473 -166 548 863 315
Expected future health shockf 3.62 3.19 -0.43 3.61 3.63 0.02 3.17 3.24 0.07
Foregone health careb 0.49 0.51 0.02 0.47 0.51 0.03 0.49 0.57 0.08
Prop. of HH members enrolled in HI 0.31 0.24 -0.07 0.37 0.26 -0.11 0.18 0.45 0.27
C. Experimental outcomes
Risk preferenceg 3.56 3.56 0 4.07 3.1 -0.96** 3.04 5.57 2.53***
Understanding of instructionsh 1.17 1.17 0 1.18 1.17 -0.01 1.16 1.21 0.04
Observations 126 102 59 67 81 21
Note: aStatistically significant mean differences are marked as follows: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.; bin the past 3 months; cInequality aversion 1 (disadvantageous): Dummy
which takes the value 1 if respondent thinks that others should not own much more than
herself ; Inequality aversion 2 (advantageous): dto. ...not own much less... (see Section
2.3.2 for the exact wording of questions); dNo. of GSS questions positively answered (see
Section 3.3.2); eThe wealth index bases on the ownership of 11 household items (house,
land, poultry, goats, sheep, cows/bullocks, refrigerator, radio, bicycle, motorcycle, car)
and is constructed by using weights generated by principal component analysis; fExpected
likelihood of unaffordable HH health expenditures within next year; gNumber of lottery
the subject has chosen out of 8 different lotteries with an increasing degree of riskiness,
with 1(=safe income) to 8 (=riskiest lottery) (see Section 2.3.2); hAverage number of trials
needed to answer the comprehension test questions correctly.
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3.3.2 Plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption and common support
As discussed in Section 3.1.2 the identification strategy for the treatment effects conditional on risk
exposure requires controlling for all factors that determine both subjects’ project choice and the
willingness to make transfers. Within the experiment we collected all information suggested to be
important by theory and the empirical literature to render the unconfoundedness assumption (A3)
plausible. We expect that risk preference, which we measure with the risk preference game, is one of
the most important determinants of project choice. Moreover, background risk theory (e.g. Gollier
and Pratt, 1996) suggests that individuals reduce financial risk taking in the presence of other,
even independent risks. Therefore, subjects’ risk exposure in their real life might influence their
decisions in the lab (Harrison et al., 2010). Moreover, individuals may also be less willing to make
transfers in the presence of other risks because they want to preserve a certain capacity to cope
with negative shocks with their own resources. Thanks to our rich data set, we can draw on a broad
range of variables reflecting exposure to the main sources of risk, such as income risk (occupation
in paid employment, type of main occupation) and health and health expenditure risk (past and
expected future health shocks, health insurance enrolment). Additionally, we have measures of the
capacity to cope with negative shocks (wealth, household composition). Proxies for social capital
and inequality aversion may also be relevant for predicting both project choice and the willingness
to make transfers. Higher levels of trust and cooperation as well as inequality aversion in a society
can encourage greater informal risk-sharing among community members and therefore provide
better risk coping possibilities (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Moreover, higher social capital
is found to promote financial risk-taking (Guiso et al., 2004). We observe five variables which
are typically used to measure these factors (e.g. Gine´ et al., 2010; Karlan, 2005): trust, fairness,
helpfulness and two measures of inequality aversion (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed description of
these variables).
Table 3, column c), which compares the characteristics of risk and safety choosing persons
under CHOICE, shows indeed systematic differences with respect to several of the just mentioned
characteristics. In particular, we observe a lower average degree of risk aversion and a higher
average degree of inequality aversion among risk takers as well as some other differences that are
related to background risk and ability to cope with negative shocks, such as type of main occupation
and number of other earners in the household. Table 3, column c), also shows lack of common
support for three variables: main occupation farming, main occupation manufacturing/repairing
of goods and the residual ethnicity category. We estimate all of our results with and without
enforcing common support and show that they are robust.
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3.4 Choice of control variables
Having discussed imbalances across the randomized samples as well as the variables required for
selection correction, we now discuss the choice of specific control variables for the estimations
specified in Table 2. In general, we estimate one version with and one without covariates for
all estimations. Whenever we use controls, four variables are always included: a dummy for
males, for residence in the Kibera slum, and one for inequality aversion (2), as well as the risk
preference measure. The latter three are important both for balancing the randomized samples,
and for determining project choice and the willingness to make transfers under CHOICE. The
male dummy turned out to be important in omitted variable tests for most of the estimations.
Additionally, we add control variables on a case-by-case basis. Due to the relatively small number
of observations we started with parsimonious specifications motivated by the descriptive evidence
in Table 3, theory, and previous empirical research discussed in the last section. We then added
covariates stepwise based on omitted variables test. For continous variables (such as age, income,
education etc.), we tested both the continuous variable as well as derived dummy variables to
account for possible non-linear dependencies. As many of the variables are highly correlated, the
number of additional covariates is not too large, ranging between 5-7. The exact specifications
together with the corresponding estimation results for the covariates are reported in Appendix
A in Tables A2 and A3. To correct for imbalances across the RANDOM and CHOICE samples
visible in Table 3, we additionally include the variables age, monthly income, two dummy variables
for household composition as well as an indicator for ethnicity. To correct for selectivity in risk
taking in the CHOICE treatment we include, in addition to the four baseline covariates, controls for
income, occupational status, household composition, insurance enrolment, ethnicity and fairness.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive evidence
The first experimental outcome that we are interested in is actual project choice. Table 4 displays
how safe and risky projects are distributed within and across treatments. In the RANDOM group,
the randomization created relatively similar proportions of safe (46.8%) and risky (53.2%) project
holders as intended. When being able to choose the project freely in the CHOICE group, however,
only a minority of the subjects preferred the risky lottery. Specifically, we observe 32.6 percentage
points fewer persons with the risky project in CHOICE than in RANDOM, a difference which is
highly statistically significant. Given that 77.2% of the participants can be classified as risk averse
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according to the risk preference game (see Table 1), this finding is not surprising since the lottery
involves a high chance of earning nothing without offering a higher expected payoff than the safe
option in return.
Table 4: Distribution of projects by treatment
RANDOM CHOICE Difference
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
n % n %
Safe project 59 46.83 81 79.41
Risky project 67 53.17 21 20.59 -32.59***
Observations 126 102
Note: Statistically significant mean differences:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Second, we are interested in whether the possibility to choose freely between projects affects
individuals’ giving behaviour. Table 5 displays the share of individuals making positive transfers
by treatment in rows (1) and (4), as well as by project within treatment in rows (2) and (3) for
RANDOM and in rows (5) and (6) for CHOICE. The lower part of Table 5 shows differences
between those shares by treatment in row (7), by treatment conditional on projects in rows (8)
and (9) as well as by project within treatment in rows (10) and (11). These difference provide a
preview on possible effects before accounting for selectivity in risk taking under CHOICE.
Table 5: Proportion of subjects making positive transfers
Project of partner
All Safe Risky Difference
Project of donor (a) (b) (b)-(a)
RANDOM % n % n % n % P-value
(1) All 42.0 193 35.8 67 45.2 126 9.4 0.20
(2) Safe+ 40.7 59 - - 40.7 59 - -
(3) Risky 42.5 134 35.8 67 49.3 67 13.4 0.12
CHOICE % n % n % n % P-value
(4) All 34.9 123 28.6 21 36.3 102 7.7 0.50
(5) Safe+ 39.5 81 - - 39.5 81 - -
(6) Risky 26.2 42 28.6 21 23.8 21 -4.7 0.73
Differences across treatments P-value P-value P-value P-value
(7) All: (4)-(1) -7.0 0.21 -7.3 0.54 -9.0 0.17 -1.7 0.88
(8) Safe: (5)-(2) -1.2 0.89 - - -1.2 0.9 - -
(9) Risky: (6)-(3) -16.4** 0.05 -7.3 0.54 -25.4** 0.03 -18.2* 0.09
Differences within treatments P-value P-value P-value P-value
(10) RANDOM: (3)-(2) 1.9 0.81 - - 8.6 0.34 - -
(11) CHOICE: (6)-(5) -13.3 0.13 - - -15.7 0.16 - -
Note: Statistically significant mean differences: * p<0.10 , ** p<0.05 , *** p<0.01. +Holders of
safe projects only make transfers to worse-off partners holding the risky project because
partners with the safe project are always equally well off.
In the RANDOM treatment about 40% of subjects are willing to make transfers with only
small differences between safe and risky project holders. For subjects assigned to the risky project
we observe a notable difference in the willingness to share income depending on the level of risk
faced by beneficiaries, though. Subjects who have been lucky in the risky lottery are 13 percentage
20
points more likely to share their payoff with partners who have been unlucky in the same lottery
than with partners ending up with the safe outcome. With a p-value of 0.12 this difference is close
to reaching statistical significance on the 10% level. This result points to particularly high degrees
of solidarity when facing risk for exogenous reasons in environments such as the slums of Nairobi
where our subjects are from where mutual aid has a strong tradition and is an important risk
pooling device.
Under CHOICE we observe similar shares of about 40% of subjects willing to give for those who
choose the safe project. However, of those individuals who choose the risky project a significantly
smaller share is willing to make transfers in case they are lucky, especially to partners who have
also self-selected into the risky project but have been unlucky. For the latter the difference to
the RANDOM treatment is highly statistically significant with 25 percentage points compared to
insignificant 7 percentage points for partners who choose the safe project. Together this yields a
statistically significant average reduction the willingness to give of 16 percentage points. Hence,
giving behaviour conditional on risk exposure seems to differ systematically between the RANDOM
and the CHOICE treatment suggesting that there is a direct behavioural effect which is negative
and driven by a change in behaviour of subjects who self-select into the risky project. In the
next section we will assess whether this finding is confounded by selection bias resulting from
self-selection into projects under CHOICE.
4.2 Econometric analyses
In the following we present and discuss the results of the econometric analyses we conducted as
described in Section 3.2. We always present estimates with and without conditioning on covariates
as discussed in Section 3.4 allowing us to assess whether imbalances across randomized samples and
self-selection into projects in the CHOICE treatment affect the results. When using covariates, we
report probit estimates, expressed as average marginal effects (AME), as well as inverse probability
weighting (IPW) estimates which provide a better approximation to the average treatment effect
compared to probit in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Moreover, we assess effect
heterogeneity with respect to the project choice of the partners who are assigned to our subjects and
who are therefore the recipients of possible transfers. Further, we estimate everything separately
for the full sample and for the sample in which we impose common support with respect to risk
taking under CHOICE. Since applying the IPW approach and focusing on the common support
sample produces the most reliable estimates, we will mainly concentrate on these results in the
following discussion.
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Table 6: Overall treatment effects and treatment effects conditional on risk exposure
Full sample Common support
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
OLS Probit IPW OLS Probit IPW
Effect Project of
donor
Project of
partner Coeff. AME Coeff. Coeff. AME Coeff.
Overall treatment effects
θR - - -.326*** -.327*** -.329*** -.286*** -.309*** -.306***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
θY All All -.070 -.051 -.039 -.126* -.100
+ -.088
(.258) (.441) (.529) (.056) (.132) (.164)
All Risky § -.090 -.081 -.085 -.142** -.122* -.126*
(.171) (.239) (.212) (.042) (.081) (.072)
Treatment effects conditional on risk exposure
θY,0 Safe Risky
‡ -.012 -.014 .014 -.036 -.052 -.032
(.890) (.871) (.873) (.689) (.545) (.712)
θY,1 Risky All -.163
+ -.162 -.111 -.204* -.229* -.177**
(.108) (.174) (.212) (.051) (.050) (.045)
Risky Risky -.254** -.264* -.223** -.296** -.322** -.278**
(.026) (.067) (.037) (.012) (.023) (.014)
Risky Safe -.072 -.066 .002 -.111 -.142 -.076
(.534) (.626) (.989) (.355) (.295) (.451)
Note: Covariates are indicated in Table A2 and A3 in Appendix A. Probit coefficients are expressed as average marginal
effects (AME). Standard errors are robust (Inverse probability weighting, IPW) or clustered at the individual level (OLS,
Probit). Statistically significant coefficients:
+
p<0.15 , * p<0.10 , ** p<0.05 , *** p<0.01. P-values in parentheses.
§The overall effect θY for the subsample of transfers to partners with the safe project corresponds to the conditional
effect θY,1 for this subsample (reported in the last row of this table) since only risky project holders make transfers to
safe project holders. ‡Holders of the safe projects only make transfers to worse-off partners holding the risky project
because partners with the safe project are always equally well off.
4.2.1 Overall treatment effects
Table 6 reports in the upper panel the estimation results for the overall effects of CHOICE on risk
taking (θR) and on the willingness to make transfers (θY ). In line with the descriptive results, we
find that the possibility to choose freely between projects reduces the share of subjects with the
risky project significantly by about 30 percentage points. This finding is clearly linked to the fact
that the majority of the participants in the experiment is risk averse. Moreover, the strength of
the effect underlines the importance of considering this mechanism as a separate impact channel
on solidarity behaviour.
In line with the negative effect on risk taking we find that the overall effect of CHOICE on the
willingness to make transfers is also negative. The magnitude of the negative effect is around 9
percentage points in the common support sample with statistical significance nearly on the 15%
level. When focusing on recipients of transfers who hold the risky project the magnitude of the
effects is even larger by 4 percentage points with statistical significance also increasing to the 10%
level. This suggests that there are, as hypothesized, some factors other than risk taking at work
through which free project choice influences solidarity.
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When comparing different estimates of the effects in the different columns of Table 6 we find that
they are robust to both including covariates with small sample imbalances across the randomized
samples and the estimator used. Moreover, the effects in the full and common support sample
are of similar magnitude for risk taking and larger in absolute value for the willingness to make
transfers. The latter points to some effect heterogeneity with respect to the characteristics without
common support.
4.2.2 Treatment effects conditional on risk exposure
Given the observed overall negative effect of free project choice on the willingness to make transfers
we now statistically test whether this effect, as discussed in Section 3.1.2, is driven by a change in
giving behaviour and not simply the result of different levels of risk exposure across treatments.
The coefficients θY,0 and θY,1 in the lower panel of Table 6 capture the effects of free choice on
willingness to make transfers when holding risk exposure constant. Hence, they are informative
about possible behavioural effects not resulting from changes in risk taking behaviour. As project
choice is not random under CHOICE the results without covariates (columns 4 and 7 in Table
6) are potentially affected by selection bias. Interestingly, though, the estimated effects remain
virtually unchanged when including the covariates needed for selection correction. However, it is
dangerous to conjecture from this that selection bias is not an issue. Quite to the contrary, as
we have shown in Section 3.3.2, a highly selective group of individuals chooses the risky project
under CHOICE. Leaving out important covariates does change the results (not reported). It just
happens that, when we appropriately account for selectivity, the estimated eects are very close to
the ones without accounting for selectivity.
Confirming the descriptive results of Table 5, persons with the safe project do not condition
their giving behaviour on whether project choice is free or not: the coefficient θY,0 is close to
zero and p-values are quite high. In contrast, persons with risky projects give significantly less
when projects can be selected. For these individuals the willingness to make transfers is around
18 percentage points lower under CHOICE than under RANDOM. This result implies that we can
reject the hypothesis that the average effect on the willingness to give we measure is entirely caused
by differential risk taking under CHOICE compared to RANDOM in favour of the alternative of
the existence of a direct behavioural effect. Our findings show, though, that the behavioural
response is limited to risk takers. This asymmetry compared to holders of the safe project suggests
that compensation motives matter: risky project holders seem to be less willing to share their
good-state lottery outcome when everyone can freely determine his or her risk exposure, i.e. when
everyone had the chance - through project choice - to receive the high payoff. When comparing
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the estimates of θY,1 for the samples with transfers to partners with both types of projects and
those with risky projects only, we find that the willingness to make transfers to the latter is even
lower by an additional 10 percentage points. Hence, having a partner who failed after choosing
the risky project deliberately additionally reduces solidarity. This suggests that attributions of
responsibility also matter. Correspondingly, we find that the coefficient θY,1 for the subsample
of transfers to partners who selected the riskless option and hence did not provoke neediness is
statistically insignificant.
To sum up, the evidence presented in Table 6 regarding the effects of free choice conditional
on project type (θY,r) shows that free project choice induces a change in giving behaviour which is
characterized both by a generally higher reluctance to share high but risky payoffs and by an even
higher reluctance to support individuals who have exposed themselves deliberately to high risk but
have suffered the negative outcome. As we do not find any behavioural changes for individuals who
choose the safe project, these findings suggest that individuals may consider the high payoff in the
risky project as a well-deserved compensation for accepting the risk which they are less willing to
share than money they can earn safely, especially with unlucky risk takers because they could have
avoided their loss at no cost by choosing the safe project. They seem to feel less of an obligation
to show solidarity in this case compared to the situation where sharing partners face unfavourable
outcomes not because of their own doing but because of pure bad luck. This interpretation is in
line with our finding that lucky winners in a lottery they face by pure chance show particularly
high solidarity with unlucky losers in the same lottery, as indicated in Table 5.
5 Conclusion
In this study we experimentally investigate whether solidarity, which is a crucial base for informal
insurance arrangements in developing countries, is sensitive to the extent to which individuals
can influence their risk exposure. With slum dwellers of Nairobi our design measures subjects’
willingness to share income with a worse-off partner both in a setting where participants could
either deliberately choose or were randomly assigned to a safe or a risky project.
We find that the overall willingness to support others is significantly lower when the level of
income risk can be chosen freely compared to when it is completely exogenous. Comparisons of
transfers across treatments conditional on subjects’ risk exposure reveal that solidarity is affected
by a change in giving behaviour of risky project holders under free choice, who are less generous
than their counterparts in the random treatment. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that this
finding is driven by behavioural mechanisms which are linked to both the donor’s choice as well
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as the recipient’s choice. Firstly, since persons with safe income in contrast to risk takers, do not
condition their transfer behaviour on whether project choice is free or not, this suggests that risk-
taking individuals want to preserve their good-state outcome as merited reward for bearing the
risk. Secondly, given that the willingness to share is especially low when partners end up empty-
handed as a result of their risky choice instead of purely bad luck, this indicates that attributions
of responsibility dampen solidarity.
Our findings have important implications for policies that possibly interact with existing infor-
mal insurance arrangements. One example is the promotion of innovative production technologies
(e.g. new crops) which are typically more profitable but also riskier compared to traditional tech-
niques. If such (observable) risk taking indeed crowds out solidarity, this impact must be taken into
account when implementing these policies. Combining such interventions with formal insurance
programs could then be a necessary option to compensate for reduced informal risk protection.
The knowledge on behavioural patterns behind solidarity could also be exploited for an effective
design of formal insurance interventions. On the one hand, the availability of formal insurance
with voluntary take-up may reduce solidarity with individuals who choose not to insure themselves
which may counteract the objective of increasing risk pooling and income equality (cf. Landmann
et al., 2012; Lenel and Steiner, 2017; Lin et al., 2014). On the other hand, if subjects are not
willing to support self-inflicted neediness, this might legitimate differentiated insurance premiums
according to the riskiness of behaviour.16 Such risk-adjusted contributions could be decisive in
increasing enrolment in formal insurance schemes in developing countries and to improve financial
sustainability of these schemes.
There are some possible limitations and extention possibilities regarding our study. Firstly,
given that in the free choice treatment participants endogenously choose between a safe and a
risky project we base the identification of the treatment effects conditional on risk exposure on
a critical unconfoundedness assumption. While the detailed survey data retrieved during the
experiment allows us to presume that we have all relevant information at our disposal to render
this identification strategy plausible, the unconfoundedness assumption is not testable. However,
in Wunsch and Strobl (2017) we discuss different identification strategies that exploit the double
randomization nature of the experiment and that allow assessing the plausibility of identification
based on the unconfoundedness assumption which is supported for the experiment and data we
study here. Secondly, our experimental design does not allow us to distinguish between sharing
16Interestingly, the health insurance scheme Gonoshasthaya Kendra in rural Bangladesh ap-
plies premiums that are differentiated according to smoking habits (see http://www.munichre-
foundation.org/dms/MRS/Documents/Microinsurance/2012 IMC/2012IMC Presentations-and-papers/P4-
MIC2012-Paper-Chowdhury/P4%20MIC2012%20Paper%20Chowdhury.pdf).
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motives induced by own and partner’s actions in the endogenous risk treatment. In a follow-up
study we will therefore adjust the experimental set-up in a way that allows for this distinction in
order to get further insights in the behavioural patterns behind solidarity. Thirdly, our anonymous
one-shot game implicitly focuses on transfers motivated by intrinsic motivations such as altruism
or distributive preferences. Allowing for repeated interactions and comparing the results to ours
would allow investigating which role reciprocity and strategic incentives play in the relationship
between risk taking and solidarity. Fourthly, our experiment investigates solely a situation where
the outcomes of the safe and risky option are equal in expectation. However, solidarity might be
affected differently when taking risk generates higher or lower expected returns than safe projects.
While in the first case, the willingness to give might increase since risk taking is perceived as more
profitable and acceptable, the contrary might be the case in the second scenario, in which risk takers
are not adequately compensated for their risky choice and might be regarded as irresponsible. Our
results can therefore be viewed as upper or lower bounds of these two scenarios regarding the
impact of free risk exposure choice on solidarity (cf. Cettolin and Tausch, 2015).
References
Acharya, A., Blackwell, M., Sen, M. (2016). Explaining causal findings without bias: Detecting
and assessing direct effects. American Political Science Review, 110(3), 512-529.
Amendah, D. D., Buigut, S., Mohamed, S. (2014). Coping strategies among urban poor: Evidence
from Nairobi, Kenya. PloS one, 9(1).
Binswanger, H.P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. Amer-
ican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62, 395-407.
Bolle, F., Costard, J. (2013). Who shows solidarity with the irresponsible? WZB Discussion Paper
No. SP II 2013-308.
Brandts, J., Charness, G. (2011). The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey
of experimental comparisons. Experimental Economics, 14, 375-398.
Brick, K., Visser, M., Burns, J. (2012). Risk aversion: Experimental evidence from South African
fishing communities. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(1), 133-152.
Cappelen, A.W., Konow, J., Sorensen, E.O., Tungodden, B. (2013). Just Luck: An experimental
study of risk taking and fairness. American Economic Review, 103(4), 1398-1413.
Cassar, A., Wydick, B. (2010). Does social capital matter? Evidence from a five-country group
lending experiment. Oxford Economic Papers, 62(4), 715-739.
Cettolin, E., Tausch, F. (2015). Risk taking and risk sharing: Does responsibility matter? Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 50, 229–248.
26
Charness, G., Genicot, G. (2009). Informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment. The
Economic Journal, 119(537), 796-825.
Charness, G., Viceisza, A. (2011) Comprehension and Risk Elicitation in the Field: Evidence from
Rural Senegal. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 01135, International Food Policy Research Institute.
Dave, C., Eckel, C.C., Johnson, C.A., Rojas, C. (2010). Eliciting risk preferences: When is simple
better? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 41(3), 219-243.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., Wagner, G. (2011). Individual risk
attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 9(3), 522-550.
Eckel, C., Grossman, P. (2002). Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes toward
financial risk. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23(4), 281–295.
Fafchamps, M. (2011). Risk sharing between households. In: Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson,
M.O. (Eds.) Handbook of Social Economics, Volume 1B (pp. 1255-1279). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Fafchamps, M., Lund, S. (2003). Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines. Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 71(2), 261–287.
Falco, P. (2014). Does risk matter for occupational choices? Experimental evidence from an African
labour market. Labour Economics, 28, 96–109.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., Ramos, X. (2010). Inequality aversion and risk attitudes. IZA Dicussion
Paper No. 4703.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental
Economics, 10, 171-178.
Fischer, G. (2011). Contract structure, risk-sharing, and investment choice. LSE STICERD Re-
search Paper No. EOPP023.
Galarza, F. (2009). Choices under risk in rural Peru. MPRA Paper No. 17708, Munich Personal
RePEc Archive.
Gine´, X., Jakiela, P., Karlan, D., Morduch, J. (2010). Microfinance games. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3), 60-95.
Gollier, C., Pratt, J.W. (1996). Risk vulnerability and the tempering effect of background risk.
Econometrica, 64(5), 1109-1123.
Greig, F., Bohnet, I. (2008). Is there reciprocity in a reciprocal-exchange economy? Evidence of
gendered norms from a slum in Nairobi, Kenya. Economic Inquiry, 46(1), 77-83.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L. (2004). The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development.
American Economic Review, 94(3), 526-556.
Harrison, G. (2008). Maximum likelihood estimation of utility functions using STATA. Working
Paper No. 06-12, Department of Economics, University of Central Florida.
Harrison, G.W. Humphrey, S.J., Verschoor A. (2010). Choice under Uncertainty: Evidence from
Ethiopia, India and Uganda. Economic Journal, 120(543), 80–104.
27
Harrison, G.W., Rutstroem, E.E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. In: Cox, J.C, Harrison,
G.W. (Eds). Risk aversion in experiments. Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 12 (pp.
41-196). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Haushofer, J., Collins, M., de Giusti, B., Njoroge, J.M., Odero, A., Onyango, C., Vancel, J., Jang,
C, Kuruvilla, M.V., Hughes, C. (2014). A methodology for laboratory experiments in developing
countries: Examples from the Busara Center. Unpublished manuscript.
Holt, C.A., Laury, S.K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review,
92(5), 1645-1655.
Jakiela, P. (2015). How fair shares compare: Experimental evidence from two cultures. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 118, 40-54.
Jakiela, P., Ozier, O. (2016). Does Africa need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental evidence
from village economies. Review of Economic Studies, 83, 231-268.
Karlan, D. S. (2005). Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict financial
decisions. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1688-1699.
Kimani, J.K., Ettarh, R., Kyobutungi, C., Mberu, B., Muindi, K. (2012). Determinants for partic-
ipation in a public health insurance program among residents of urban slums in Nairobi, Kenya:
Results from a cross-sectional survey. BMC Health Service Research, 12(66).
Kinnan, C. (2014). Distinguishing barriers to insurance in Thai villages. Unpublished manuscript.
Krawczyk, M. (2010). A glimpse through the veil of ignorance: Equality of opportunity and support
for redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 94(1), 131-141.
Landmann, A., Vollan, B., Froelich, M. (2012). Insurance versus savings for the poor: Why one
should offer either both or none. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6298.
Laury, S.K. (2006). Pay one or pay all: Random selection of one choice for payment. Experimental
Economics Center Working Paper Series No. 2006-24, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
Le Clainche, C., Wittwer, J. (2015). Responsibility-sensitive fairness in health financing: Judgments
in four European countries. Health Economics, 24(4), 470-480.
Lenel, F., Steiner, S. (2017). Insurance and solidarity: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experi-
ment in Cambodia. Unpublished manuscript.
Lin, W., Liu, Y., Meng, J. (2014). The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk
sharing: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 184-211.
Mathauer, I., Schmidt J.O., Wenyaa, M. (2008). Extending social health insurance to the informal
sector in Kenya. An assessment of factors affecting demand. International Journal of Health
Planning and Management, 23(1), 51-68.
Narayan, D., Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and sociability: Household income and social capital in
rural Tanzania. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(4), 871-897.
28
Ngau, P. (1987). Tensions in Empowerment: The Experience of the ”Harambee” (Self-Help) Move-
ment in Kenya. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 35(3), 523-538.
Pearl, J. (2001). Direct and indirect effects. In: Breese, J.S., Koller, D. (Eds.). Proceedings of the
17th conference on uncertainty in artificial intelligence (pp. 411-420). San Francisco: Morgan
Kaufmann.
Robins, J. M. (2003). Semantics of causal DAG models and the identification of direct and indirect
effects. In: Green, P., Hjort, N., Richardson, S. (Eds.). Highly Structured Stochastic Systems
(pp. 70-81). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roemer, J.E., Trannoy, A. (2015). Handbook of Income Distribution. In: Atkinson, A. B., Bour-
guignon, F. (Eds.). Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2A (pp. 217-300). Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Schokkaert, E., Devooght, K. (2003). Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cul-
tures. Social Choice and Welfare, 21(2), 207-242.
Selten, R. (1967). Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschrankt rationalen Verhaltens
im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperimentes. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beitra¨ge zur experimentellen
Wirtschaftsforschung (pp. 136-168) Tu¨bingen: Mohr.
Sloczynski, T. (2016). A general weighted average representation of the ordinary and two-stage
least squares estimands. Unpublished manuscript.
Strobl, R. (2016). Health Risk, Health Insurance and Investment Behaviour: A lab experiment
with Nairobi Slum Residents. Unpublished manuscript.
The Economist (2012). Boomtown Slum – A Day in the Economic Life of Africa’s Biggest Shanty-
Town. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568592-day-economic-life-
africas-biggest-shanty-town-boomtown-slum.
Townsend, R.M. (1994). Risk and insurance in village India. Econometrica, 62(3), 539–591.
Trhal, N., Radermacher, R. (2009). Bad luck vs. self-inflicted neediness - An experimental investi-
gation of gift giving in a solidarity game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 517-526.
Wunsch, C., Strobl, R. (2017). Identification and estimation of direct and indirect effects in
between-subject double randomization designs. Unpublished manuscript.
29
A Appendix: Estimation results
Table A1: Determinants of risk taking in the risk preference game
Coeff. (SE)
Age 0.004 (0.008)
Male -0.011 (0.158)
Kibera -0.042 (0.165)
No. of adults -0.017 (0.040)
No. of children -0.045 (0.041)
Employed in paid work -0.547** (0.236)
Wealth index quintile 2 0.241 (0.285)
Wealth index quintile 3 0.234 (0.213)
Wealth index quintile 4 0.011 (0.227)
Wealth index quintile 5 0.202 (0.225)
Enrolled in health insurance 0.144 (0.182)
Visited health care provider -0.123 (0.153)
Expected future health shock 0.018 (0.026)
GSS index 0.114 (0.088)
Inequality aversion 1 0.096 (0.174)
Inequality aversion 2 0.187 (0.165)
Ordered probit constant 1 -0.160 (0.315)
Ordered probit constant 2 0.122 (0.313)
Ordered probit constant 3 0.283 (0.313)
Ordered probit constant 4 0.653** (0.315)
Ordered probit constant 5 0.731** (0.316)
Ordered probit constant 6 0.959*** (0.319)
Ordered probit constant 7 1.625*** (0.333)
Observations 228
Note: Estimation method is ordered probit. Dependent
variable: lottery number chosen in the risk preference game.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table A2: Estimation results for unrestricted effects with covariates
Full sample Common support
Dependent variable Yi Yi Ri Yi Yi Ri
Project of partner Both Risky Both Risky
Choice -0.136 -0.218 -0.966*** -0.277 -0.343* -0.884***
(0.176) (0.187) (0.198) (0.186) (0.201) (0.204)
Male 0.192 0.276 0.061 0.371** 0.473** 0.051
(0.164) (0.180) (0.189) (0.176) (0.195) (0.199)
Kibera 0.149 0.162 0.0658 0.127 0.173 0.009
(0.174) (0.186) (0.196) (0.190) (0.204) (0.210)
Inequality aversion 2 -0.111 0.076 0.324* -0.178 0.0172 0.384*
(0.164) (0.184) (0.194) (0.177) (0.199) (0.211)
Risk preference -0.025 -0.041 0.027 -0.016 -0.036 0.035
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Ethnicity: Kamba -0.226 -0.157 0.376 -0.148 -0.020 0.319
(0.251) (0.257) (0.254) (0.260) (0.272) (0.259)
Age -0.00025 -0.0095 -0.0056 0.0048 -0.0076 -0.0082
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Monthly income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of adults 0.033 0.049 -0.016 0.021 0.048 0.011
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051)
No. of dependents -0.036 -0.027 -0.013 -0.082* -0.080* 0.011
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Constant -0.273 -0.011 0.023 -0.369 -0.071 -0.062
(0.335) (0.368) (0.394) (0.363) (0.409) (0.408)
Observations 316 228 228 276 197 197
Note: Estimation method is probit. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table A3: Estimation results for treatment effects conditional on risk exposure (with covariates)
Full sample Common support
Dependent variable Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi
Project of subject Safe Risky Risky Risky Safe Risky Risky Risky
Project of partner Risky Both Risky Safe Risky Both Risky Safe
Choice -0.039 -0.450 -0.751* -0.197 -0.158 -0.641* -0.941** -0.423
(0.241) (0.337) (0.428) (0.406) (0.262) (0.336) (0.443) (0.409)
Male 0.390* 0.009 0.229 -0.234 0.566** 0.163 0.412 -0.076
(0.236) (0.252) (0.302) (0.309) (0.258) (0.266) (0.324) (0.331)
Kibera 0.345 0.102 0.194 0.0143 0.394 -0.00341 0.127 -0.140
(0.235) (0.253) (0.305) (0.320) (0.259) (0.260) (0.322) (0.331)
Inequality aversion 2 0.181 -0.169 0.076 -0.460 0.222 -0.187 0.0265 -0.431
(0.244) (0.249) (0.326) (0.336) (0.279) (0.269) (0.352) (0.361)
Risk preference -0.014 -0.042 -0.076 -0.010 -0.043 -0.019 -0.048 0.011
(0.045) (0.054) (0.064) (0.065) (0.052) (0.058) (0.068) (0.070)
Unemployed 0.099 -0.034 0.025 -0.092 0.412 -0.047 -0.052 -0.024
(0.259) (0.275) (0.324) (0.325) (0.295) (0.296) (0.352) (0.352)
Prop. of HH members with HINS 0.105 0.037 0.215 -0.136 0.102 0.0278 0.239 -0.177
(0.202) (0.215) (0.243) (0.242) (0.224) (0.212) (0.248) (0.235)
GSS: Fairness -0.465* 0.508* 0.309 0.738** -0.601** 0.455 0.168 0.760**
(0.243) (0.299) (0.358) (0.367) (0.282) (0.297) (0.372) (0.369)
Monthly income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of adults 0.020 0.050 -0.001 -0.007 0.026 -0.038
(0.071) (0.081) (0.087) (0.074) (0.087) (0.093)
Ethnicity: Luhya -0.200 -0.603* 0.170 -0.238 -0.723* 0.182
(0.298) (0.352) (0.375) (0.312) (0.392) (0.398)
No. of other earners -0.000 0.098
(0.084) (0.097)
Constant -0.458 -0.240 -0.203 -0.308 -0.659 -0.194 -0.123 -0.294
(0.361) (0.365) (0.447) (0.469) (0.421) (0.380) (0.486) (0.505)
Observations 140 176 88 88 118 158 79 79
Note: Estimation method is probit. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10
B Appendix: Experimental instructions (exemplarily for
CHOICE)
The entire experiment involved three games. Thereof, only two games are relevant for this study,
with Game 2 corresponding to the risk preference game and Game 3 to the risk solidarity game.
Also, in Game 3 we asked subjects to state their expectations on their partners’ transfers, however,
we do not use this information in this study. For the sake of simplicity, we therefore present a
version of the original instructions shortened by the parts that are not relevant for this study.
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General instructions  
 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in our study. You are now taking part in an experiment on 
economic decision-making. 
 
 
Three Games:  
In the following, you will play three short games, named [Game 1,] Game 2 and Game 3. In each 
game, you will make one or several decisions. The result of your decision(s) will determine how 
much money you can finally earn in the respective game. We will explain later, how these three 
games work in detail. 
 
 
Payment: 
However, please note that we will only pay you according to the result in one of the three games.  
 
How will we determine your payment? 
The computer will record what you have finally earned [in Game 1,] in Game 2 and in Game 3. At 
the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select [Game 1,] Game 2 or Game 3 with 
equal chance. We will pay you in shillings the final earnings you have made in this selected game. 
So, please remember that you will receive either your final earnings [from Game 1 or] from Game 2 
or from Game 3, according to what game the computer will randomly select. Therefore, it is 
important to think carefully about the choice you make in each game. 
 
 
Test Questions: 
Before each game starts, we will ask you to answer a few test questions to check if the rules of the 
games are clear to you. Please note that you will not get money for your answers and decisions in 
these test questions. 
 
 
Questionnaire: 
After completing the three games, we will ask you to answer a few short questions about yourself 
and your household.  
 
All your decisions and answers in this study will be kept confidential and only used for academic 
research purposes. 
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Instructions for Game 2 
 
[Game 2 is very similar to the game before. But please note that it is completely independent from 
. Here is how Game 2 works. Game 1]
 
Project Income: 
 
Assume that within your business, you have  a choice of 8 different income opportunities and [again]
you have to decide which one you want to realize. The table on your screen describes these income 
opportunities, named Project K to R: 
 
[Screenshot 1] 
 
 
 
We will ask you to choose 1 out of the 8 projects. How much money you can earn from a project is 
 based on flipping a coin.  the computer flips a coin after you have [again] [As in the game before,]
chosen your preferred project. If the coin lands on heads, you earn the amount given in the column 
“HEADS” in the row of your chosen project. If the coin lands on tails, you earn the amount given in 
the column “TAILS” in the row of your chosen project. Please choose the project that you prefer the 
most. There is no right or wrong answer. 
 
 
Summary: 
 
The picture on your screen shows the sequence of events in Game 2.  
Please note that steps 2 to 3 will be done after you have completed the decision task of GAME 3. 
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[Screenshot 2] 
 
 
 
Instructions for Game 3 
 
In this game, you will make decisions that will determine your earnings and the earnings of another 
participant. Please note that Game 3 is completely independent of Game 2. Here is [Game 1 and] 
how Game 3 works.  
 
1) Project Choice 
In this game, you have a choice of 2 different income opportunities, named Project X and Y. The 
table on your screen describes these two projects.  
 
[Screenshot 3] 
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With each of these projects you can earn some income. We will ask you to choose 1 of the 2 projects. 
The amount of money you can earn from a project is again based on flipping a coin, as in Game [1 
 2. If the coin lands on heads, you earn the amount in the column “HEADS” for your chosen and]
project. If the coin lands on tails, you earn the amount in the column “TAILS” for your chosen 
project. Please choose the project that you prefer the most. There is no right or wrong answer. 
 
2) Partner 
After you have chosen your preferred project, the computer will randomly pair you with another 
person in this room. However, you will not know which person your partner is. His or her identity 
will be not revealed either during or after the game. Your partner will also have already chosen either 
project X or Y. How much he/she will earn from the project is also determined by coin flip. Please 
note that another coin will be flipped for your partner, so that you both get individual results (i.e. 
heads or tails). Please also note that you will not know your partner’s project choice and project 
income until the end of Game 3. 
 
3) Transfers 
In this game, you can give some of your project income to your partner if you want to. Please note 
that you can give some of your income to your partner, but you do not have to. The amount that you 
decide to transfer to your partner will be deducted from your project income and added to your 
partner’s project income. Just as you, your partner can give some of his/her income to you if he/she 
wants to, but he/she also does not have to. The amount that he/she decides to transfer to you will be 
deducted from his/her project income and added to your project income. Please note that you both 
will decide how much you want to transfer to your partner before both of your project incomes are 
determined by coin flip. So, we will ask you both to decide in advance on the amount you wish to 
transfer for every possible combination of incomes you both might earn. The next two examples will 
explain the possible cases. 
 
Example 1 – You choose Project X 
Please look at your screen.  
[Screenshot 4] 
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This screen appears, if you have chosen Project X. With Project X, you will earn 400 shillings, 
regardless of whether the coin lands on heads or on tails. We will ask you to decide how much you 
would like to transfer from your project income of 400 shillings to your partner. As the partner’s 
income is not yet known, we will ask you to decide on your transfers for every possible amount that 
your partner might have earned with his/her chosen project. Therefore, the first question (in green) 
ask what amount you would like to transfer from your project income of 400 shillings to your partner 
if  your partner has also chosen Project X and earns 400 shillings. Please enter the amount that you 
would like to give to your partner by using the number pad. You can enter any amount between 0 
and your full project income, that is 400 shillings in this example.  
 
 
[Screenshot 5] 
 
 
Similarly, the second and third questions ask what amount you would like to transfer to your partner 
if you earn 400 shillings and your partner has chosen Project Y and earns 800 or 0 shillings. For each 
question, you can enter any amount between 0 and your full project income, that is 400 shillings. 
Your entered transfer amounts will appear in the small grey boxes (here on your screen, they are left 
empty). Please note that later only one of the three possible partner’s incomes will be realized, 
depending on which project your partner has chosen and what the result of the partner’s coin flip is. 
The transfer amount that you have stipulated for exactly this realized partner’s income will be 
deducted from your project income afterwards. 
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Example 2 – You choose Project Y 
[Screenshot 6] 
 
 
 
If you have chosen Project Y, you will earn 800 shillings if the coin lands on heads and 0 shillings if 
the coin lands on tails. If you earn 0 shillings, you cannot make any transfers to your partner. If you 
earn 800 shillings, you can transfer some money to your partner. So, we will ask you to decide how 
much you would like to transfer to your partner if you would earn 800 shillings. As in Example 1, we 
will ask you to enter your transfer amounts for each of your partner’s possible project incomes, that 
is 400, 800 and 0 shillings. Again, you can enter any amount between 0 and your full project income, 
that is 800 shillings in this case. As already explained in Example 1, later only one of the three 
possible partner’s incomes will be realized. The transfer amount that you have stipulated for exactly 
this realized partner’s income will be deducted from your project income afterwards. Please note that 
you and your partner make the transfer decisions simultaneously. Please also note that you will not 
know how much your partner has decided to give to you until the end of Game 3. Also, your partner 
will not know your transfer decisions until the end of Game 3.  
 
 
5) Coin flip 
After you have entered the [transfer] amounts, the computer will determine your project income by 
flipping a coin. The computer will also determine your partner´s project income by flipping another 
coin. The computer will now credit you and your partner with the transfer amounts that you each 
stipulated for each other for exactly the now realized incomes. 
 
6) Final earnings of Game 3: 
Your final earnings from Game 3 will be your project income MINUS the transfer that you made to 
your partner PLUS the transfer that your partner made to you. 
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Summary: 
 
The picture on your screen shows the sequence of events in Game 3.  
 
[Screenshot 7] 
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